The Impact of Board Interlocking on the Market Value Added of Listed Companies on the Stock Exchange of Thailand: The Moderating Effect of Managerial Ownership

Authors

  • Warithorn Tuethong Master’s Degree Student in Data and Analytics, Kasetsart Business School, Kasetsart University, E-mail: Warithornt.t@live.ku.th
  • Suchada Jiamsagul Assistant Professor (D.B.A.), Kasetsart Business School, Kasetsart University, E-mail: fbussdj@ku.ac.th

Keywords:

Board Interlocking, Market value added, Managerial Ownership, The Stock Exchange of Thailand

Abstract

This study aims to examine the impact of board interlocking on market value added (MVA), with managerial ownership serving as a moderating variable. The sample consists of 1,350 firm-year observations from 450 listed companies on the Stock Exchange of Thailand from 2021 to 2023. Both descriptive and inferential statistics were used for data analysis. This study utilized a multiple regression model based on the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (Pooled OLS) method.

The findings reveal that board interlocking is positively associated with market value added at the 5% significance level. This suggests that directors holding positions across multiple firms can significantly enhance firms’ market value added, in line with the Resource Dependence Theory. Furthermore, the results indicate that managerial ownership negatively moderates the relationship between board interlocking and market value added, at the 5% significance level. In other words, as the proportion of managerial ownership increases, the value enhancing effect of board interlocking diminishes. This finding aligns with Agency Theory, which highlights the potential risk of managerial behavior that may diverge from shareholder interests. In addition, the study finds that firm size is negatively associated with market value added, whereas return on assets exhibits a positive relationship with market value added.

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Published

2025-07-31

How to Cite

Tuethong, W., & Jiamsagul, S. (2025). The Impact of Board Interlocking on the Market Value Added of Listed Companies on the Stock Exchange of Thailand: The Moderating Effect of Managerial Ownership. NIDA Business Journal, (36), 75–93. retrieved from https://so10.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/NIDABJ/article/view/2670

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Research Articles